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The ability to distinguish friends from foes allows humans to engage in mutually beneﬁcial
cooperative acts while avoiding the costs associated with cooperating with the wrong
individuals. One way to do so effectively is to observe how unknown individuals behave
toward third parties, and to selectively cooperatewith thosewho help otherswhile avoiding
those who harm others. Recent research suggests that a preference for prosocial over
antisocial individuals emerges by the time that infants are 3 months of age, and by
8 months, but not before, infants evaluate others’ actions in context: they prefer those
who harm, rather than help, individuals who have previously harmed others. Currently
there are at least two reasons for younger infants’ failure to show context-dependent social
evaluations. First, this failure may reﬂect fundamental change in infants’ social evaluation
system over the ﬁrst year of life, in which infants ﬁrst prefer helpers in any situation and only
later evaluate prosocial and antisocial actors in context. On the other hand, it is possible
that this developmental change actually reﬂects domain-general limitations of younger
infants, such as limited memory and processing capacities. To distinguish between these
possibilities, 4.5-month-olds in the current studies were habituated, rather than familiarized
as in previous work, to one individual helping and another harming a third party, greatly
increasing infants’ exposure to the characters’ actions. Following habituation, 4.5-month-
olds displayed context-dependent social preferences, selectively reaching for helpers of
prosocial and hinderers of antisocial others. Such results suggest that younger infants’
failure to display global social evaluation in previous work reﬂected domain-general rather
than domain-speciﬁc limitations.
Keywords: social evaluation, infancy, cooperation, domain-general processes, domain specificity, context-
dependence
INTRODUCTION
Human cooperation presents an evolutionary puzzle. Although
human beings are easily the most cooperative and altruistic species
on earth (Tomasello, 2009; Melis and Semmann, 2010), helping
others is personally costly and there is uncertainty that such efforts
will be returned. Thus, cooperative systems are constantly in dan-
ger of being overtaken by individuals who reap the beneﬁts of
others’ costly prosocial acts but do not take costs to help oth-
ers in return. To solve the puzzle of how cooperation could have
evolved, theorists argue that human prosocial motivations must
emerge in tandemwith capacities for social evaluation and partner
choice. That is, cooperation is possible because humans are selec-
tive cooperators: they readily assess others’ cooperative potential
and choose social partners accordingly, allowing them to pay the
costs of cooperating only to those likely to pay them back. Non-
cooperators, on the other hand, are shunned or actively punished,
making non-cooperation a less beneﬁcial strategy overall (e.g.,
Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984; Alexander, 1987; Cosmides, 1989;
Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Price et al.,
2002; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003). Although some claim that
humans evolved capacities to detect cheaters in social exchanges
speciﬁcally (e.g., Delton et al., 2012), others treat sociomoral eval-
uation and partner choice as more general solutions to various
problems inherent to group living; promoting bigger and big-
ger acts of altruism, curbing aggression between group members,
allowing for the establishment of a variety of group norms, etc.
(e.g., Alexander, 1987; Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Sober and Wil-
son,1998; Flack anddeWaal,2000; Katz,2000;Hammerstein,2003;
Hardy and Van Vugt, 2006; Barclay and Willer, 2007; Nesse, 2007;
Boehm, 2012).
Supporting the possibility that humans developed capacities
for social evaluation and partner choice along with tendencies
toward cooperation and prosociality comes from recent evidence
that very young infants engage in third party social evaluations,
suggesting they are not solely the result of socialization and learn-
ing processes (reviewed in Hamlin, 2013a). Speciﬁcally, as early as
3 months of age infants prefer puppet characters who help, versus
prevent, third parties in achieving their unfulﬁlled goals, despite
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having no immediate “stake” in the interaction and not knowing
anyone involved. Infants’ preferences for prosocial versus antiso-
cial puppets are measured by selective attention in 3-month-olds
(who cannot yet reach) and by both selective looking and reaching
in older infants, and occur in response to helpers and hinderers of
several different goal scenarios, including a goal to reach a partic-
ular location, to have a dropped object returned, and to obtain an
object that is beyond a physical barrier (Hamlin et al., 2007, 2010,
2013b; Hamlin and Wynn, 2011). Critically, infants do not distin-
guish characters who direct identical physical actions toward an
inanimate object or toward an agent who was not clearly demon-
strating an unfulﬁlled goal, suggesting their preferences do not
reﬂect liking or disliking particular lower-level perceptual aspects
of the events (Hamlin, in revision; Hamlin et al., 2010; Hamlin
and Wynn, 2011; c.f. Scarf et al., 2012a and response by Hamlin
et al., 2012a). Finally, by 8–10 months of age infants’ evaluations
are based on others’ intentions to help or hinder rather than what-
ever outcomes happened to occur: infants prefer those who try
but fail to help over those who try but fail to hinder, but they do
not distinguish those who actually helped and hindered if they did
not know they were doing so (e.g., Hamlin, 2013b; Hamlin et al.,
2013b).
Of course, adults’ social evaluations are not limited to sim-
ple heuristics whereby all “locally” intentional prosocial acts are
good and all antisocial ones are bad (Heider, 1958). Instead, adults
demonstrate more “global” evaluations, readily assessing the very
same behaviors differently in different contexts. For example, even
though punishment is itself antisocial, adults readily punish those
who have behaved antisocially and approve of others who do
so (see Bright and Keenan, 1995; Maurer, 1999; Barclay, 2006;
Gürerk et al., 2006; Friedland,2012), and like thosewho share their
social tastes and distastes, even when shared distaste is signaled by
an antisocial act (as illustrated by the phrase “the enemy of my
enemy is my friend,” e.g., Heider, 1958; Aronson and Cope, 1968;
Gawronski et al., 2005). In a study exploring one type of context-
dependent social evaluation in infancy, Hamlin et al. (2011; see
also Hamlin et al., 2013a) compared infants’ preferences for Givers
versus Takers of a dropped ball when the individual who dropped
it had either just helped or just hindered anunknown third party in
his goal to open a box. Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that if infants
engage in only local evaluations they should prefer Givers to Takers
across the board; if infants are capable of global evaluations their
preferences should differ based on the past behavior of the tar-
geted individual. Both 8-month-olds infants and 19-month-old
toddlers showed markedly different choice patterns depending
on the target of giving and taking, selecting givers when tar-
gets were prosocial and takers when targets were antisocial. To
address whether infants’ context-speciﬁc preferences reﬂect mere
“valence-matching,” or a preference for those whose interactions
maintain the same valence over time, additional groups of 8- and
19-month-olds chose between givers and takers when a target had
previously received, rather than performed, an antisocial act. Vic-
tims of antisocial behaviors do not deserve further mistreatment,
nor do adults wish to befriend their enemies, but they are clearly
(however unwilling) participants in a negatively valenced act, and
continuously struggle and fail to achieve a goal (see Skerry and
Spelke, 2014, for evidence that infants appreciate the emotional
consequences of goal achievement and failure by 8 months of
age). If infants simply prefer valence-matchers without analyzing
who did what to whom or distinguishing between various forms
of negative valence present during hindering, then they should
be even more likely to choose takers from victims than from hin-
derers. Critically, both 8- and 19-month-olds preferred givers to
victims, ruling out the low-level valence-matching alternative for
infants’ context-speciﬁc choices (but see Scarf et al., 2012b, and
response by Hamlin et al., 2012b).
Five-month-olds in Hamlin et al. (2011) were tested on the very
same procedures but showed no evidence of context-dependence
(nor, notably, of valence-matching): they preferred those who gave
to versus took fromall targets, whether prosocial or antisocial. This
performance difference suggests that the ability to demonstrate
global social evaluations develops between 5 and 8 months after
birth. That said, the nature of this development remains unclear.
On the one hand, development between 5 and 8monthsmay occur
within the domain of social evaluation itself. Infants might ﬁrst
possess relatively simple “helpful = good and/or harmful = bad”
heuristics that are impervious to contextual information of any
kind, and later develop the ability to evaluate prosocial and anti-
social actions in context. Such domain-speciﬁc change could be
prompted by infants’ everyday experiences: as infants age and
become increasingly mobile they are presumably confronted with
more and more locally antisocial behavior performed by individ-
uals infants are sure they like (their caregivers) toward individuals
infants are sure they like (themselves, their peers and/or sib-
lings). These experiences might then drive infants to adjust their
rigid social evaluation system in order to incorporate information
related to who did what to whom and why. That is, in a process
of accommodation (e.g., Piaget, 1928), global social evaluation
might emerge as infants encounter, and are motivated to make
sense of, apparent inconsistencies in their increasingly complex
social world. Notably, 8 months is also the time when mentalis-
tic third party social evaluation has ﬁrst been observed in infants
(Hamlin, 2013b).
A second (non-mutually-exclusive) possibility for younger
infants’ failure is that 5-month-olds are limited in terms of mem-
ory, processing speed/capacity or other domain-general ability
relative to 8-month-olds. Indeed, the methodology used in Ham-
lin et al. (2011) was extremely complex relative to past work on
social evaluation in younger infants, and may have placed insur-
mountable demands on 5-month-olds’ processing and memory
capacities. To illustrate, infants in Hamlin et al. (2011) saw two
different types of prosocial and antisocial interactions within the
same study, both the box and the ball scenarios. Although infants
readily distinguish prosocial from antisocial others when shown
either one of these scenarios, no previous work has demonstrated
they can do so when shown both types, much less integrate infor-
mation across the two. In addition, while in past studies infants
have had to keep track of three unique characters who are all
onstage together at the start of each event, in the global evaluation
procedure infants must keep track of ﬁve distinct characters, only
three of whom are ever onstage at once. Finally, infants in Hamlin
et al. (2011) were not only given more information to process than
in past work, they also had less time to process it: past work has uti-
lized a habituation procedure in which infants are shown prosocial
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and antisocial events repeatedly until a pre-speciﬁed criterion is
reached (between three and seven events each; habituation is taken
to indicate sufﬁcient event processing, for review see Colombo and
Mitchell, 2009), whereas infants in Hamlin et al. (2011) saw just
one prosocial and one antisocial event in each of the box and
ball scenarios. Therefore, perhaps 5-month-olds selected givers
over takers following the ball scenario simply because they ini-
tially failed to process or subsequently forgot what the target in
the ball shows had done, and so they evaluated givers and tak-
ers as if the target was an unknown third party. If so, then the
procedure was not actually a test of 5-month-olds’ capacity for
context-dependent social evaluation in the ﬁrst place.
Consistent with this possibility, there are clear improvements
in infants’ processing and memory capacities with age. Younger
infants are slower to process information than are older infants,
younger infants forget information faster after equivalent exposure
than do older infants, and younger infants show striking difﬁ-
culty retrieving information over changes in context whereas older
infants do better (for reviews see Roveé-Collier, 1997, 1999; Hayne,
2004; Bauer, 2007; Colombo and Mitchell, 2009). Neuroimaging
work has linked functional development in learning and memory
in infancy to changes in temporal cortical memory networks
known to underlie declarative memory in adults, with signiﬁcant
changes happening during the second half-year of life (reviewed
in Richmond and Nelson, 2007). Together, this work suggests that
given equal exposure time 8-month-olds should be, on average,
markedly better than 5-month-olds at encoding, retaining, and
retrieving information from one phase of an experiment to the
next.
MOTIVATION FOR THE CURRENT STUDIES
The current studies were designed to distinguish between domain-
speciﬁc and domain-general accounts of the observed difference
in 5- and 8-month-olds’ social evaluations in Hamlin et al. (2011).
Infants from 3.5 to 5.5 months of age were tested, with an average
age of 4.5 months. All methodologies were identical to Ham-
lin et al. (2011), except that memory and processing demands
were reduced: rather than being shown one prosocial and one
antisocial box event in the ﬁrst phase of the procedure, infants
were habituated to prosocial and antisocial box events, seeing
alternating events repeatedly until their attention following each
event decreased by half (details below). Dominant theoretical
approaches to habituation characterize it as a process of align-
ment, by which an internal representation of an external stimulus
becomes more similar to the stimulus itself (e.g., Sokolov, 1963;
see review in Colombo and Mitchell, 2009). Therefore, habituat-
ing infants to box events should in some way or another sharpen
their internal representations of thewould-beTargets of giving and
taking, which they might utilize while observing giving and tak-
ing. After habituation, 4.5-month-olds were shown just one giving
and one taking ball event before choosing between the giving and
taking puppets, as in Hamlin et al. (2011).
If 4.5-month-olds in the current study perform as 5-month-
olds in Hamlin et al. (2011), consistently choosing givers over
takers even after being habituated to prosocial and antisocial box
events, this would lend support the possibility that differences
in social evaluation at 5 and 8 months reﬂect some change in
the system of social evaluation itself, whereby infants move from
initially rigidly viewing helping as good and hindering as bad
to incorporating contextual nuance into their social assessments.
On the other hand, if 4.5-month-olds choose Givers to Prosocial
Targets but Takers from Antisocial Targets, it would suggest that
younger infants’ failure to demonstrate global social evaluation
in Hamlin et al. (2011) was due to difﬁcult task demands com-
bined with domain-general limitations in memory and processing
capacities.
EXPERIMENT 1: PROSOCIAL AND ANTISOCIAL TARGETS
METHOD
Participants
Fifty-ﬁve full-term and typically developing infants between 3.5
and 5.5 months of age participated. An additional 22 infants
began or completed the procedure but were not included in
the ﬁnal sample due to fussiness (13 infants), procedural error
(4), failure to choose either puppet (4), or parental interference
(1). Data collection ended somewhat early (the original inten-
tion was 32 infants/condition) in time to submit the manuscript
for this special issue; in total there were 28 infants in the
Prosocial Target condition (14 females; mean age = 4 months;
19 days; range = 3;16–5;16) and 27 infants in the Antisocial
Target condition (16 females; mean age = 4 months; 17 days;
range = 3;18–5;16). Twenty of 28 infants in the Prosocial Target
condition and 19 of 27 in the Antisocial Target condition had were
ﬁrst born and had no siblings at the time of testing.
Procedures
All procedures were approved by the Behavioral Research Ethics
Board at the University of British Columbia and conform to
relevant regulatory standards.
Stimuli and procedures are identical to Hamlin et al. (2011)
unless otherwise noted, and are depicted in Figure 1. Infants
participated in two Stimuli Phases and a Choice Phase. For each
Stimuli Phase, infants sat in their parent’s lap before a table (W :
122 cm) surrounded on three sides with blue curtains; a curtain
with cartoon animal cutouts on it (85 cm from the infants) could
be lowered to occlude the puppet stage so stimuli could be reset
between events. Parents were instructed to sit quietly with their
infants and not attempt to inﬂuence them in any way. Before the
start of the study parents practiced getting into the appropriate
position for the Choice Phase, turning 90◦ to the right and mov-
ing back about 30 cm (placing their feet on a duct tape line on
the ﬂoor), perching their infants at the front of their knees (not
leaning back against their chest), and holding them tightly around
the lower abdomen. Parents were told how important it is that
infants face straight ahead and have sufﬁcient trunk support to
ensure clear reaches at this young age. Infants were habituated to
up to 14 puppet events in Stimuli Phase 1, and were familiarized
to exactly two puppet events in Stimuli Phase 2. Additional details
of each Phase are described below.
Stimuli Phase 1: box helping and hindering events. Depicted in
Figures 1A,B. The curtain rose to reveal two pink pigs (one in a
blue shirt, one in green) resting at the back corners of the puppet
stage; a clear box containing a brightly-colored toy rested at the
center of the stage, approximately 20 cm in front of the pigs. To
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FIGURE 1 | Stimuli. Depictions of Prosocial/Antisocial puppet shows during
Phase 1 and Giving/Taking puppet shows during Phase 2 of Experiment 1
(example of the Antisocial Target condition). Phase 1 (A) Prosocial Box Events.
The Cow enters the stage and tries but fails to open the box. The Prosocial Pig
helps him open it. The Cow lies down on top of the toy inside the box, and the
Prosocial Pig runs offstage. Phase 1 (B) Antisocial Box Events. The Cow
enters the stage and tries but fails to open the box. The Antisocial Pig jumps
on top of the box, slamming it shut. The Cow lies down next to the box
without the toy, and the Antisocial Pig runs offstage. Phase 2 (A) Giving Ball
Events. The Antisocial Pig from Phase 1 enters the stage, and picks up a ball
resting in the center. The Pig drops and catches the ball several times, and
then drops the ball toward the Giver Tiger. The Pig turns to “ask” for the ball
back, and the Giver rolls the ball back to him and runs offstage. Phase 2 (B):
taking Ball Events. The Antisocial Pig enters and plays with the ball as in
Giving Events. He then drops the ball toward theTaker Tiger, and asks for it
back as in Giving Events. TheTaker Tiger runs offstage, stealing the ball away.
begin each and every event, a Cow puppet wearing a yellow t-shirt
entered from the back center of the stage, and ran around one side
of the box and“looked” inside twice, as if seeing the toy inside. The
Cow then jumped up on top of the nearest corner of the box lid,
and lifted the box lid a small amount a total of ﬁve times, lowering
it in between as though unable to open the box. During Prosocial
Events, during the ﬁfth struggle the Prosocial Pig (resting in the
corner of the opposite side of the stage from where the Cow was
struggling) ran forward, grasped the opposite corner of slightly
open box lid, and opened the box together with the Cow. The Cow
jumped into the open box, lay his body down on top of the toy
inside, and paused. The Prosocial Pig then jumped off the box lid
and ran offstage to complete the event. During Antisocial Events,
during the ﬁfth struggle the Antisocial Pig ran forward (the side
of the box the Cow struggled with alternated per event so that the
Prosocial and Antisocial Pigs could remain in the same corners
throughout the procedure) and jumped on top of the slightly-
open box lid, slamming it shut. The Cow jumped off the box, lay
his body down on the stage, and paused, and the Antisocial Pig
jumped off the box and ran offstage.
Once the Prosocial/Antisocial Pig ran offstage at the end of
each event, an online coder coded infants’ attention toward
and away from the puppet stage using a key-press via the
program jHab (Casstevens, 2007). Coding ended when infants
looked away from the stage for 2 consecutive seconds or after
30 total seconds elapsed, as indicated by a “ding” from the
jHab program. After each ding the curtain was lowered and
the next event was readied. Infants viewed prosocial and anti-
social events in alternation until they reached a pre-set habit-
uation criterion in which their attention over three consecu-
tive events summed to less than half their attention over the
ﬁrst three events that themselves summed to 12 s or more.
If infants failed to reach this criterion, they were shown 14
total events in Stimuli Phase 1. In Phase 1, the event order,
side of stage, and t-shirt color of the Prosocial Target was
counterbalanced.
Once infants completed Phase 1, the online coder and pup-
peteer from Phase 1 switched places. The new puppeteer (former
coder) did not know which puppet had performed which action
during Phase 1, and remained blind to condition while puppeteer-
ing Phase 2 by reading the shirt color of the Target Pig for Phase 2
from a script only s/he had access to. The new coder, despite having
puppeteered during Phase 1 and knowing which Pig was which,
could not see the stage during Phase 2 and so did not know which
Pig was the Target of Giving and Taking.
Stimuli Phase 2: ball giving and taking events. The curtain rose
to reveal two Tiger puppets, wearing a pink and a purple t-shirt,
resting at the back corners of the stage. A ball rested at the center of
the stage. Depending on condition, either the Prosocial Pig from
Phase 1 (in the Prosocial Target condition) or the Antisocial Pig
from Phase 1 (in the Antisocial Target condition) entered from
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behind the back curtain, and ran forward to grasp the ball. The
Target then bounced twice, holding the ball, and then released and
grasped the ball, as though playingwith it. The Target repeated this
jump-release-retrieve sequence twice more; on the fourth release
the ball rolled towardone side of the stage or the other. DuringGiv-
ing Events, the Giver (closest to the ball) ran forward and grabbed
the ball. The Target then turned toward the Giver and opened its
arms wide, as though “asking” for the ball back; the Giver turned
toward the Target as though acknowledging him, and both pup-
pets turned back to face the infant simultaneously. This sequence
repeated once more; the third time the Target turned toward the
Giver, the Giver rolled the ball back to the Target (a distance of
approximately 30 cm), and then ran offstage. The Target turned
back to face the infant, holding the ball, and all action paused. Dur-
ing Taking Events, the Taker (closest to the ball because it dropped
toward the other side of the stage) ran forward and grabbed the
ball. The Target “asked” for its ball back twice as in Giving Events;
on the third request the Taker rushed offstage, stealing the ball
away. The Taker turned back to face the infant without the ball
and all action paused. Infants’ attention to each event was recorded
as in Phase 1. Unlike in Phase 1, infants in Phase 2 were shown
a total of two events, one Giving and one Taking (as in Hamlin
et al., 2011). During Stimuli Phase 2, the t-shirt color, event order,
and side of the Giver and Taker were counterbalanced in each
condition.
After Stimuli Phase 2, parents were instructed to get into posi-
tion for choice, and were asked to adjust their infants if necessary.
Once infants were in the appropriate position, parents were asked
to close their eyes.
Choice. The coder from Phase 2, who knew neither which Tiger
was the Giver or the Taker nor whether each infant was in the
Prosocial or the Antisocial Target condition, presented the choice.
The puppeteer from Phase 2 placed puppets in the choice pre-
senters’ appropriate hands by reading from a script only s/he had
access to, and the choice presenter hid the Tigers behind her back
as she appeared from behind the curtain that had been on the
infants’ right during the puppet shows (now about 45◦ to infants’
left). The choice presenter kneeled directly in front of the infant,
said “Hi!” and established eye contact. S/he then brought both
puppets into view (but out of reach, approximately 60 cm away)
as she said said “Look!”. Infants were required to look toward
each puppet; if an infant failed look at both spontaneously when
they were ﬁrst introduced, the presenter would shake one or both
puppets as necessary to ensure the infant saw each one (with
instructions that infants’ gaze should land on each puppet for
as brief a time a possible). Finally, the choice presenter said “Hi!”
again, reestablished eye contact so that an infant did not simply
choose whichever puppet s/he had just been looking toward, and
moved the Tigers within reach (approximately 15–30 cm away),
saying “Who do you like?”. Each infant’s “choice” was identiﬁed
online by the choice presenter as the ﬁrst puppet contacted via a
visually guided reach (touching a puppet preceded immediately
by looking at it). The side of the Giver/Taker was counterbal-
anced during choice. An additional 25% of infants’ choices in
each condition were recoded for reliability purposes; reliability
was 100%.
RESULTS
Attention was analyzed using t-tests and ANOVAs; statistics
reported include 95% Conﬁdence Intervals (CIs). Choices were
analyzed using non-parametric tests for categorical data (binomial
tests for comparing a given choice distribution to chance (50%);
Fisher’s Exact Tests and Chi-squares for comparing choice distri-
butions across conditions) and also include 95% CIs. All statistics
were generated via SPSS,www.vassarstats.net (for non-parametric
analyses) and ESCI (Cumming, 2012).
Attention during Stimuli Phase 1
Rate of habituation. Across conditions, infants habituated in
an average of 8.73 events (SEM = 0.37). This number dif-
fered marginally by condition (variance assumption violated,
independent-samples t(49) = −1.90, p = 0.065, Cohen’s d = 0.51,
95% CI of difference [−2.78,.08]). Infants in the Prosocial target
condition habituated in an average of 9.39 (SEM = 0.58; 95% CI
[8.20, 10.58]) events (22/28 infants habituated within 14 events)
and infants in the Antisocial Target condition habituating in 8.04
(SEM = 0.42, 95% CI [7.18, 8.90]) events (26/27 infants habitu-
ated within 14 events). The difference in the percentage of infants
per condition who habituated within 14 events also approaches
marginal signiﬁcance (2X2 Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.10; 95% CI
on the difference [−1, 36]). As infants in both conditions viewed
exactly the same events during Phase 1, and because during Phase 1
both puppeteers and coders were blind to infants’ condition, these
marginal interactions are considered spurious (in addition, there
were no effects of whether infants reached habituation during
Phase 1 on infants’ puppet choices; see below).
Attention to prosocial versus antisocial events. Infants attended
equally to Prosocial and Antisocial Events across conditions,
whether comparing looks to the ﬁrst instance of each [ﬁrst Proso-
cial (SEM)= 11.27 s (1.18); ﬁrstAntisocial (SEM)= 10.17 s (1.07);
paired−t(54) = 0.90, p = 0.37, d = 0.13, 95% CI [−5.64, 3.44]
or to the average across the ﬁrst 3 instances of each [as per the
habituation criterion, all infants saw at least three of each event
type; average ﬁrst three Prosocial (SEM) = 8.78 s (0.80); average
ﬁrst three Antisocial (SEM) = 8.18 s (0.72); paired t54 = 0.90,
p = 0.37, d = 0.11, 95% CI [−3.68, 2.46]. As expected given that
all infants viewed the exact same events during Phase 1, repeated-
measures ANOVAs with condition as a between-subjects factor
revealed that infants’ relative attention to Prosocial versus Antiso-
cial Events did not differ by condition (ﬁrst Prosocial/Antisocial:
F1,53 = 0.67, p = 0.41, η2p = 0.01; average ﬁrst three Proso-
cial/Antisocial: F1,53 = 0.56, p = 0.46, η2p = 0.01). This lack of
attention difference to Prosocial versus Antisocial acts suggests
that 4.5-month-old infants do not hold baseline expectations for
whether unknown third parties will help or hinder other unknown
third parties.
Attention to giver and taker events during Phase 2
Across conditions, infants attended equally to Giver and the Taker
Events [Giver (SEM) = 6.24 (0.78), Taker (SEM) = 7.32 (0.87);
paired-t(54) = –1.26, p = 0.22, d = 0.17, 95% CI [−2.25,
4.39]; this did not differ by condition (repeated-measuresANOVA,
F1,53 = 0.02, p = 0.90, η2p = 0.00). These results replicate what was
reported in Hamlin et al. (2011) and suggest that 4.5-month-olds
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do not hold expectations for how independent third parties will
treat those they (the infants) know have helped or hindered oth-
ers (see Meristo and Surian, 2013 for positive evidence with older
infants and fair/unfair distributors).
Choice
Preliminary analyses. Choice results are depicted in Figure 2.
When collapsed across conditions, preliminary binomial tests
revealed no effects of side, color, or giving/taking action on infants’
choices (p’s > 0.41). Both across and within conditions, habitua-
tors and non-habituators chose in the direction of the hypothesis
at equal rates (Fisher’s Exact pAcross = 0.59, pWithinProsocial = 1.0,
pWithinAntisocial = 1.0). Interestingly, males in the Antisocial Target
condition were more likely to choose the Taker than were females
(Fisher’s Exact p = 0.05); this difference was not observed in the
Prosocial Target condition (p = 1.0) nor collapsed across both
(p = 0.16) and so is not addressed further. The choice pattern of
infants with siblings did not differ from those without (Fisher’s
Exact p’s > 0.54). Finally, a multivariate ANOVA on whether
infants chose with or against the hypothesis and whether infants
chose the Giver or Taker with age as a covariate revealed no effects
of age on infants’ choices (F’s1,54 < 1.05, p’s> 0.31, η2p’s< 0.03).
Choice of givers versus takers. Infants’preference for theGiver ver-
sus the Taker puppet differed signiﬁcantly by condition [Pearson’s
χ2 (df = 1) = 25.14, p < 0.0001]. Speciﬁcally, infants were 67%
more likely to choose the Giver in the Prosocial Target than in the
Antisocial Target condition (95% CI on difference does not cross
0 [42, 81]). Infants in the Prosocial Target condition signiﬁcantly
preferred the Giver over the Taker (25 of 28 infants; binomial
p = 0.00003; 95% CI on the percentage choosing the Giver is
entirely above chance (50%) [73, 96]), whereas infants in theAnti-
social Target condition signiﬁcantly preferred the Taker over the
Giver (21 of 27 infants; binomial p = 0.006; 95% CI on percentage
choosing the Giver is entirely below chance [10, 41]). Infants’ like-
lihood to choose in the direction of the hypothesis did not differ by
condition (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.30; 95% CI [−31, 9]): infants
were equally likely to choose Givers to Prosocial Targets as they
were to choose Takers to Antisocial Targets. Finally, infants’ rate
of choosing Givers versus Takers differed signiﬁcantly between the
current Antisocial Target condition, in which infants were habit-
uated during Phase 1 (21 of 27 chose Taker), and the Antisocial
Target condition of Hamlin et al. (2011), in which infants were
only familiarized during Phase 1 [2 of 16 chose Taker; Pearson’sχ2
(df = 1) = 17.21, p< 0.0001], reﬂecting a 65% [35, 80] difference
in rate of choosing the Taker.
DISCUSSION
Results from Experiment 1 suggest that given more time to pro-
cess the initial prosocial and antisocial acts of the eventual targets
of giving and taking, even 4.5-month-olds demonstrate context-
dependent social evaluations, preferring those who are nice (over
mean) to nice puppets and thosewho aremean (over nice) tomean
puppets. To rule out simple valence-matching effects for infants’
choices, a new group of 4.5-month-olds chose between a Giver to
and a Taker from a Victim Target as in Hamlin et al. (2011). It was
predicted that 4.5-month-olds would prefer the Giver to the Taker
in the Victim Target condition, as had both 8- and 19-month-olds
in Hamlin et al. (2011).
EXPERIMENT 2: VICTIM TARGETS
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-seven infants (14 females, mean age = 4 months; 19 days,
range = 3;16–5;12) participated. An additional 25 infants began
or completed the procedure but were not included in the ﬁnal
sample due to fussiness (7 infants), procedural error (8), failure
to choose either puppet (5), parental interference (2), and general
inattentiveness or sleepiness, whereby infants did not attend to
puppet events at all (3). The relatively high rate of procedure errors
in this condition was due to errors in puppeteering; speciﬁcally,
even very well trained research assistants occasionally inserted a
Helper event when there should have been a Beneﬁciary event,
or a Hinderer event when there should have been a Taker Event.
Several studies in the laboratory use box events, and so it was
fairly difﬁcult to inhibit the practicedmotor repertoires of Helping
and Hindering to perform Beneﬁciary andVictim Events. Because
these errors disrupted the meaning of the puppet shows entirely,
even one required that an infant be excluded from the sample. 19
of 27 infants were ﬁrst born.
Procedures
Procedures were very similar to those in the Antisocial Target
condition in Experiment 1, and counterbalancing was the same.
However, instead of the Cow continuously trying and failing to
open the box and being alternately helped and hindered by the
Pigs, the Pigs took turns trying and failing to open the box and
the Cow alternately helped one Pig (the Beneﬁciary) and hindered
the other (the Victim).
Stimuli phase 1: box beneﬁciary and victim events. Allmovement
details in Experiment 2 were as in Experiment 1, aside from those
changes that were necessary to ﬂip the puppets’ agent/patient roles.
Each event began when the curtain rose to reveal the Pigs resting
at each rear corner of the puppet stage and the box containing a
colorful toy in the middle. The Cow then entered from underneath
the back curtain, but instead of moving forward and attempting
to open the box himself he simply paused just in front of the
curtain while one of the Pigs made a failed attempt to open the
box. Speciﬁcally, during Beneﬁciary Events, the Beneﬁciary Pig ran
forward and looked into the box, and then tried but failed to open
it. On the Beneﬁciary’s ﬁfth failed attempt, the Cow intervened
by running around from behind the box to the side of the stage
opposite the Beneﬁciary Pig, and grasped the lid and opened it
together with the Beneﬁciary. The Beneﬁciary then jumped into
the box and lay down on the toy inside, achieving its goal, and the
Cow jumped off the box and ran offstage. During Victim Events,
the Victim Pig ran forward and tried but failed to open the box;
on the Victim’s ﬁfth attempt the Cow ran to the side of the box
opposite the Victim Pig and jumped sideways onto the box lid,
slamming it shut. The Victim jumped off the box and lay his head
on the table, failing to achieve his goal, and the Cow jumped off the
box and ran offstage. Infants’ attention following each event was
coded as in Experiment 1. Once infants’ reached the habituation
criterion or watched 14 total Beneﬁciary and Victim events, the
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FIGURE 2 | Results. Infants’ choices for the giver versus the taker (in %) across conditions. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.00005, ****p < 0.0000005.
Victim was made the Target of giving and taking during Stimuli
Phase 2.
Stimuli Phase 2: giving and taking events. As in Experiment 1,
Giving and Taking in Stage 2 was puppeteered by the coder from
Stage 1. Giving and Taking Events in Phase 2 of Experiment 2
were absolutely identical to Giving and Taking Events in Phase 2
of Experiment 1. Rather than the Target of Giving and Taking
being either the Prosocial or the Antisocial Pig, it was always the
Victim Pig.
Choice phase. As in Experiment 1, the choice was presented by the
coder from Phase 2 who had puppeteered the Beneﬁciary/Victim
Events during Phase 1. Although Experiment 2 was not “double
blind” in the same way as Experiment 1 (because only the Victim
condition was run), the choice presenter was entirely unaware of
which puppet had been the Giver and the Taker during Phase 2
and so s/he could not unduly inﬂuence infants’ choices. An addi-
tional 25% of infants’ choices in each condition were recoded for
reliability purposes; reliability was 100%.
RESULTS
Results in the Victim Target are ﬁrst presented alone, and then
compared to infants in Experiment 1.
Attention during Stimuli Phase 1
Rate of habituation. Infants in the Victim Target condition habit-
uated in 9.26 (SEM = 0.56; 95% CI [8.11, 9.41]) trials, with 23/27
habituating within 14 trials. The number of habituation events
viewed by infants in each condition did not differ [univariate
ANOVA on how many events infants viewed during habituation
with condition (Prosocial Target, Antisocial Target,Victim Target)
as a between-subjects factor: F2,79 = 2.01, p = 0.14; η2p = 0.05].
Attention to beneﬁciary versus victim events. Infants looked
equally to the ﬁrst Beneﬁciary event and the ﬁrstVictim event they
saw [Beneﬁciary (SEM) = 8.74 s (1.55); Victim (SEM) = 7.69 s
(1.13); paired-t26 = 0.82, p = 0.42, d = 0.15; 95% CI [−3.67,
1.57]], and equally to ﬁrst three Beneﬁciary and ﬁrst three Victim
events [average three Beneﬁciary (SEM) = 8.37 s (1.12); average
three Victim (SEM) = 8.40 s (1.01); paired t26 = −0.04, p = 0.97,
d = 0.01; 95% CI [−1.55, 1.63]]. Neither measure of attention
to habitation events differed with that of infants in Experiment 1
who viewed Prosocial and Antisocial events (repeated-measures
ANOVAs on attention with condition (Prosocial Target, Antisocial
Target, Victim Target) as a between-subjects factor revealed nei-
ther main effects nor interactions with condition; F2,79’s < 1.35,
p’s > 0.24, η2p’s < 0.02). This is not surprising, given all infants
viewed the essentially the same alternatingProsocial andAntisocial
acts in all three conditions: box shows during Phase 1 only differed
based on whether there were two actors and one recipient (in
Experiment 1) or one actor and two recipients (in Experiment 2).
Attention to giving versus taking events during phase 2. Infants
looked for an average of 6.90 s (SEM = 0.96) to the Giving event
and an average of 8.06 s (1.45) to the Taking event during Phase 2;
attention did not differ by event type (paired t26 =−0.86, p= 0.40,
d = 0.18, 95% CI [−1.63, 3.95]). Attention to Giving and Tak-
ing events did not differ with either condition in Experiment 1
(repeated-measures ANOVA with condition as a between-subjects
factor, F2,79 = 0.01, p = 0.99, η2p = 0.00).
Choice
Preliminary analyses. Preliminary binomial tests revealed no
effects of side or color of the Giving Tiger on infants’ choices for
Givers over Takers (p’s > 0.21), habituators’ choice patterns did
not differ from non-habituators’ (Fisher’s Exact p = 0.58), boys
and girls preferred Givers and Takers at equal rates (Fisher’s Exact
p = 1.0) and the choice pattern of infants with siblings did not
differ from those without (Fisher’s Exact p = 1.0). An ANOVA on
infants’ choice of the Giver versus the Taker with age as a covariate
revealed no effect of age on infants’ choices (F1,26 = 2.35; p = 0.14;
η2p = 0.09). An additional 25% of infants’ choices were recoded
for reliability purposes; reliability was 100%.
Choice of givers versus takers. More infants in the Victim Tar-
get condition chose the Giver than chose the Taker (18 of 27
infants; binomial p = 0.12; 95% CI contains 50 [48, 81]). Criti-
cally, although the rate of choosing the Giver over the Taker did
www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 614 | 7
Hamlin Context-dependent social evaluation in 4.5-month-olds
not reach signiﬁcance in this sample, the rate of choosing the Taker
was signiﬁcantly different in the Antisocial Target and Victim Tar-
get conditions [Pearson’s χ2 (df = 1) = 10.8, p = 0.001]; infants
were 44% more likely to choose the Taker in the Antisocial Target
condition than in the Victim Target condition (95% CI does not
contain 0 [18, 63]). This result suggests that infants in the Anti-
social Target condition in Experiment 1 did not choose the Taker
based on valence-matching alone. That said, the rate of choos-
ing the Taker was also signiﬁcantly different between the Prosocial
Target andVictim Target conditions [Pearson’sχ2 (df = 1) = 4.12,
p = 0.04]; infants were 23% less likely to choose the Taker in the
Prosocial Target condition the Victim Target condition (95% CI
contains 0 [0, 43]). Implications for this result will be addressed
in the discussion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Results from the current studies suggest that given sufﬁcient time
to process prosocial and antisocial events, 4.5-month-olds are
capable of evaluating others’ actions in context. In contrast to
past work in which younger infants preferred prosocial Givers
over antisocial Takers regardless of the past actions of the Tar-
get of those behaviors, when 4.5-month-olds were habituated
to the past prosocial or antisocial actions of a Target they pre-
ferred Givers to Prosocial Targets and Takers from Antisocial
Targets. That younger infants require more time to process and/or
remember events than do older ones has been consistently demon-
strated in developmental psychology research (see Roveé-Collier,
1997, 1999; Hayne, 2004; Colombo and Mitchell, 2009), the cur-
rent studies demonstrate that similar information processing and
memory limitations may underlie early failures to demonstrate
context-dependent social evaluation. Notably, infants in the cur-
rent studies were only habituated to prosocial and antisocial box
events (not to giving and taking ball events): they were shown only
one giving and one taking act before asked to choose between the
Giver and the Taker. This indicates that 4.5-month-olds can eval-
uate others’ actions in context on their very ﬁrst observations of
valenced actions directed toward a valenced target, so long as their
representation of that target is sufﬁciently strong.
The current studies used preferential reaching as a measure of
infants’ social evaluations. Experimental methodologies are nec-
essarily limited to those behaviors infants are physically capable of
performing; indeed, the current studies lowered the age at which
we achieved successful reaches from infants under 4.5 months of
age. Though there are presumably countless reasons why infants
would touch one puppet versus another; including social evalua-
tion but also including perceptual interest, confusion or curiosity,
absence of fear, etc., other work using the very same box events
as in the current Stimuli Phase 1 has revealed that 16-month-
olds selectively match the food preferences of prosocial puppets
but not antisocial ones, and 21-month-olds selectively give
resources to prosocial puppets and take them from antisocial ones
(Hamlin et al., 2011; Hamlin and Wynn, 2012). Thus, although it
is critical to continue assessing atwhat level young infants’reaching
behaviors reﬂect true “evaluation,” this developmental continuity
suggests it is appropriate to (cautiously) do so.
Infants’ context-dependent evaluation did not stem entirely
from simple valence-matching mechanisms: when infants viewed
a Giver and a Taker act on a Victim Target, more preferred the
Giver, a signiﬁcantly different pattern of choice than infants in
the Antisocial Target condition. Intriguingly, infants were also
signiﬁcantly more likely to choose the Giver in the Prosocial Tar-
get than in the Victim Target condition: 89% of infants chose
a Giver to a Prosocial Target, whereas 67% of infants chose a
Giver to a Victim Target. This pattern was not observed in the
corresponding conditions Hamlin et al. (2011), wherein 8- and
19-month-olds preferred Givers to Prosocial Targets and Victim
Targets at the same rate; furthermore, here fully 2/3 of infants pre-
ferred Givers to Victims. Despite this, if the difference in rate of
choosingGivers to Prosocial versusVictimTargetswere to replicate
it would be consistent with several potential explanations. First,
perhaps valence-matching mechanisms play a role in early social
evaluations but are not entirely responsible for them. For instance,
perhaps 4.5-month-olds do like those whose interactions serve to
maintain action valence through time, as some form of valence-
based familiarity preference, thereby weakening their preference
for Givers to Victims. That the same asymmetry was not observed
in 8- or 19-month-olds in Hamlin et al. (2011) suggests either that
the asymmetry reﬂects early confusion about the roles of agent ver-
sus patient in social interactions that is overcome by 8 months of
age, or that associative effects are relatively weak and emerge only
after someone has been victimized repeatedly, as in the current
habituation methodology. Alternatively, the asymmetry in pref-
erence for Givers to Prosocial versus Victim Targets could reﬂect
some tendency to “blame the victim,” as has been demonstrated
in adults and young children (Piaget, 1932/1965; Lerner, 1980;
Jost and Hunyady, 2002; Olson et al., 2006; Olson et al., 2008).
Indeed, children show preferences for lucky and against unlucky
individuals even when the lucky and unlucky events were clearly
random (ﬁnding 5$, getting caught in the rain); in the current
studies, given that the Cow engages in both prosocial and antiso-
cial acts and directs antisocial acts toward the Victim speciﬁcally,
infants may have had reason to suspect that the Victim’s lot was
non-random. Future work might examine whether infants show a
tendency to “blame the victim” (deﬁned by smaller preferences for
Givers to Victims than for Givers to Prosocial others) in a condi-
tion in which Beneﬁciaries are helped andVictims are hindered by
two distinct individuals, as this might provide less reason to view
Beneﬁciaries and Victims as deserving their treatment.
Herein, the general terms “context-dependent” and “global”
social evaluation have referred to a very speciﬁc form of context-
based evaluation, asking whether infants prefer those who inten-
tionally harm those who have intentionally harmed others. Above
and beyond the very simple valence-matching mechanisms that
do not account (entirely) for infants’ preferences, there remain
several possibilities for the exact nature of infants’ global evalu-
ations, not disentangled by the present work. For instance, past
work suggests that infants utilize and privilege intention in their
assessment of others for their third-party prosocial and antisocial
acts by 8–10 months of age (Hamlin, 2013b; Hamlin et al., 2013b).
Do mental states inﬂuence context-dependent evaluations? If so,
whose mental states matter? For instance, would infants prefer
those who try but fail to harm intentional hinderers to those who
try but fail to help them? Would they prefer those who intention-
ally harm someone who only accidentally harmed someone else?
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In a different form of context-speciﬁc evaluation, it is as of yet
unclear to what extent the relationship between an agent and a
patient inﬂuences infants’ evaluations of intentional helping and
hindering acts. For instance, if infants could identify a hindering
agent as a “caregiver” of another agent, would they evaluate the
hinderer differently? Adults regularly excuse (or applaud) care-
givers’ hindering acts, based on the assumption that the target
needs protection rather than deserves mistreatment; it is an open
question whether infants do the same.
Although the current results suggest that some formof domain-
general development is responsible for previously observed devel-
opmental differences in context-dependent social evaluation, it
remains unclear exactly what domain-general process is responsi-
ble, or whether it is a combination of several interrelated processes.
Did 5-month-olds in Hamlin et al. (2011) fail to encode the proso-
cial and antisocial acts in Stimuli Phase 1? Or was it that they failed
to remember whodidwhat over the (very) brief delay duringwhich
the second puppet show was set up? Or was it the context-change
from box to ball events that disrupted infants’ retrieval of the pup-
pets’ past actions? Although young infants have some difﬁculty
with each of these processes (Hayne, 2004), an encoding failure
seems the least likely: infants succeeded at distinguishing Givers
and Takers after observing only one of each behavior in Stimuli
Phase 2, both here and in past work. Thus, it does not appear that
8-month-olds are simply more efﬁcient processors of prosocial
and antisocial actions in general. However, simple time-decayed
forgetting versus context-disrupted retrieval are currently difﬁcult
to tease apart. Although there is a delay after Stimuli Phase 2 during
setup for the Choice during which infants do not forget who did
what in Stimuli Phase 2 (if they did they should not be able to dis-
tinguish Givers and Takers at all), the delay after Stimuli Phase 1
is longer, as it requires trading experimenters, exchanging stim-
uli, reading scripts to identify which puppets are involved, etc. If
infants’memory for who did what is already weakened at the start
of Phase 2, then the change in context with the introduction of a
new puppet show might wash it away entirely. Future study might
examine whether utilizing more-similar contexts across Phases
would improve younger infants’ performance.
Furthermore, these results raise the question of exactly what it
is that infants in the current studies habituate to: uponhabituation,
what is contained in infants’ internal representations of prosocial
and antisocial box events? A representation of the acts themselves
and their valence? A representation of the relationship between
the helper and hinderer and the target of their actions? Or perhaps
a representation of the evaluation of the helper’s and hinderer’s
traits? Work with adults would suggest the latter (e.g., Todorov
and Uleman, 2003); but young children do not readily predict
future frompast behaviors, presumably due to a failure to attribute
traits (e.g. Boseovski and Lee, 2006). Future studies might explore
these questions by examining infants’ expectations for the future
behaviors of helpers and hinderers. For instance, do infants see
former helpers and hinderers as more likely to perform the same
action again toward a new individual, to perform a similar action
in such a way that it is no longer valenced, or to perform a different
kind of action that is of the same valence?
Finally, demonstrating that 4.5-month-olds can evaluate oth-
ers in context given sufﬁciently supportive methodological design
should not be taken as evidence that they routinely do so in their
daily lives. First, given their ﬁrst-born status and very young age, it
is relatively unlikely that our infants regularly (if ever) observe
overtly antisocial behaviors directed at individuals whom they
have also observed behaving antisocially; at least of the kind
demonstrated here that involve neither valenced facial expres-
sions nor linguistic cues. Even if such behaviors were to occur
in infants’ environments, everyday social observations presum-
ably do not provide sufﬁcient information to habituate infants
to others’ prosocial and antisocial acts, and the current stud-
ies demonstrate that habituation is required for young infants
to demonstrate context-dependent social evaluation. Although
this could be viewed as a limitation of this work, the present
ﬁndings nonetheless suggest that given sufﬁcient support, young
infants’ social evaluations share important commonalities with
older infants’ and children’s, informing our understanding of
the nature and developmental progression of social evaluation in
infancy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by an Insight Grant from the Society for
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
REFERENCES
Alexander, R. (1987). The Biology of Moral Systems. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de
Gruyter.
Aronson, E., and Cope, V. (1968). My enemy’s enemy is my friend. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 8, 8–12. doi: 10.1037/h0021234
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Barclay, P. (2006). Reputational beneﬁts for altruistic punishment. Evol. Hum. Behav.
27, 325–344. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.01.003
Barclay, P., and Willer, R. (2007). Partner choice creates competitive altruism in
humans. Proc. Biol. Sci. 247, 749–753. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2006.0209
Bauer, P. J. (2007). Remembering the Times of our Lives: Memory in Infancy and
Beyond. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Boehm, C. (2012). Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism and Shame. New
York: Basic Books.
Boseovski, J. J., and Lee, K. (2006). Children’s use of frequency information for
trait categorization and behavioral prediction. Dev. Psychol. 42, 500–513. doi:
10.1037/0012-1649.42.3.500
Boyd, R., and Richerson, P. J. (1992). Punishment allows the evolution of coop-
eration (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethol. Sociobiol. 13, 171–195. doi:
10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-Y
Bright, S. J., and Keenan, P. J. (1995). Judges and the politics of death: deciding
between the bill of rights and the next election in capital cases. Boston Univ. Law
Rev. 75, 759–835.
Casstevens, R. M. (2007). jHab: JavaHabituation Software (Version 1.0.2) [Computer
Software]. Chevy Chase, MD.
Colombo, J., and Mitchell, D.W. (2009). Infant visual habituation. Neurobiol. Learn.
Mem. 92, 225–234. doi: 10.1016/j.nlm.2008.06.002
Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: has natural selection shaped how
humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. Cognition 31, 187–276.
doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(89)90023-1
Cumming, G. (2012). Exploratory Software for Conﬁdence Intervals. [software,
Macintosh version]. Available from: http://www.latrobe.edu.au/psy/research/
cognitive-and-developmental- psychology/esci
Delton, A., Cosmides, L., Guemo, M., Robertson, T. E., and Tooby, J. (2012). The
psychosemantics of free-riding: dissecting the architecture of a moral concept.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 102, 1252–1270. doi: 10.1037/a0027026
Flack, J. C., and deWaal, F. B. M. (2000). “Any animal whatever.”Darwinian building
blocks of morality in monkeys and apes. J. Conscious. Stud. 7, 1–29.
Friedland, P. (2012). Seeing Justice Done: The Age of Spectacular Capital Pun-
ishment in France. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/
9780199592692.001.0001
www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 614 | 9
Hamlin Context-dependent social evaluation in 4.5-month-olds
Gawronski, B., Walther, E., and Blank, H. (2005). Cognitive consistency and the
formation of interpersonal attitudes: cognitive balance affects the encoding of
social information. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 41, 618–626. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2004.
10.005
Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., and Rochenbach, B. (2006). The competitive advan-
tage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312, 108–111. doi: 10.1126/science.
1123633
Hamlin, J. K. (2013a). Moral judgment and action in preverbal infants and toddlers:
evidence for an innate moral core. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 22, 186–193. doi:
10.1177/0963721412470687
Hamlin, J. K. (2013b). Failed attempts to help and harm: intention versus out-
come in preverbal infants’ social evaluations. Cognition 128, 451–474. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2013.04.004
Hamlin, J. K., Mahajan, N., Liberman, Z., and Wynn, K. (2013a). Not like me = bad:
infants prefer those who harm dissimilar others. Psychol. Sci. 24, 589–594. doi:
10.1177/0956797612457785
Hamlin, J. K., Ullman, T., Tenenbaum, J., Goodman, N., and Baker, C.
(2013b). The mentalistic basis of core social cognition: experiments in preverbal
infants and a computational model. Dev. Sci. 16, 209–226. doi: 10.1111/desc.
12017
Hamlin, J. K., and Wynn, K. (2011). Young infants prefer prosocial to antisocial
others. Cogn. Dev. 26, 30–39. doi: 10.1016/j.cogdev.2010.09.001
Hamlin, J. K., and Wynn, K. (2012). Who knows what’s good to eat? Infants fail
to match the food preferences of antisocial others. Cog. Dev. 27, 227–239. doi:
10.1016/j.cogdev.2012.05.005
Hamlin, J. K.,Wynn,K., andBloom,P. (2007). Social evaluation by preverbal infants.
Nature 450, 557–559. doi: 10.1038/nature06288
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., and Bloom, P. (2010). Three-month-olds show a neg-
ativity bias in their social evaluations. Dev. Sci. 13, 923–929. doi: 10.1111/
j.1467-7687.2010.00951.x
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., and Bloom, P. (2012a). Reply to Scarf et al.: the case for
social evaluation in infancy. Attached to Scarf et al., 2012a. PLoS ONE 7:e42698.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0042698
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., and Bloom, P. (2012b). Reply to Scarf et al.: nuanced social
evaluation: association doesn’t compute. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109, E1427.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1204712109
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., Bloom, P., and Mahajan, N. (2011). How infants and
toddlers react to antisocial others. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 19931–19936.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1110306108
Hammerstein, P. (2003). Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Hardy, C., and Van Vugt, M. (2006). Nice guys ﬁnish ﬁrst: the competitive
altruism hypothesis. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 32, 1402–1413. doi: 10.1177/
0146167206291006
Hayne, H. (2004). Infant memory development: implications for childhood
amnesia. Dev. Rev. 24, 33–73. doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2003.09.007
Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: John Wiley &
Sons. doi: 10.1037/10628-000
Jost, J., and Hunyady, O. (2002). The psychology of system justiﬁcation and the
palliative function of ideology. Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 13, 111–153. doi: 10.1080/
10463280240000046
Katz, L. (2000). Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives.
Devon: Imprint Academic.
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion. New York:
Plenum Press.
Maurer, M. (1999). Why are tough on crime policies so popular? Stanf. Law Policy
Rev. 11, 9–22.
Melis, A. P., and Semmann, D. (2010). How is human cooperation different? Phi-
los. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 365, 2663–2674. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.
0157
Meristo, M., and Surian, L. (2013). Do infants detect indirect reciprocity? Cognition
129, 102–113. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.06.006
Nesse, R. M. (2007). Runaway social selection for displays of partner value and
altruism. Biol. Theor. 2, 143–155. doi: 10.1162/biot.2007.2.2.143
Nowak, M., and Sigmund, K. (1998). The evolution of indirect reciprocity by image
scoring. Nature 393, 573–577. doi: 10.1038/31225
Olson, K. R., Banaji, M. R., Dweck, C. S., and Spelke, E. S. (2006). Children’s biased
evaluations of lucky versus unlucky people and their social groups. Psychol. Sci.
17, 845–846. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01792.x
Olson, K. R., Dunham, Y., Dweck, C. S., Spelke, E. S., and Banaji, M. R. (2008).
Judgments of the lucky across development and culture. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 94,
757–776. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.757
Panchanathan, K., and Boyd, R. (2003). A tale of two defectors: the importance of
standing for the evolution of indirect reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 224, 115–126.
doi: 10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00154-1
Piaget, J. (1928). Judgement and Reasoning in the Child. London: Routledge Ltd.
Piaget, J. (1932/1965). The Moral Judgment of the Child, Trans. M. Gabain. New
York: Free Press (Original work published 1932).
Price, M., Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (2002). Punitive sentiment as an anti-free
rider psychological device. Evol. Hum. Behav. 23, 203–231. doi: 10.1016/S1090-
5138(01)00093-9
Richmond, J., and Nelson, C. A. (2007). Accounting for change in declarative
memory: a cognitive neuroscience perspective. Dev. Rev. 27, 349–373. doi:
10.1016/j.dr.2007.04.002
Roveé-Collier, C. (1997). Dissociations in infant memory: rethinking the devel-
opment of implicit and explicit memory. Psychol. Rev. 104, 467–498. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.104.3.467
Roveé-Collier, C. (1999). The development of infant memory. Curr. Dir. Psychol.
Sci. 8, 80–85. doi: 10.1111/1467-8721.00019
Scarf, D., Imuta, K., Colombo, M., and Hayne, H. (2012a). Social evaluation or
simple association? Simple associations may explain moral reasoning in infants.
PLoS ONE 7:e42698. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0042698
Scarf, D., Imuta, K., Colombo, M., and Hayne, H. (2012b). Golden rule or valence
matching? Methodological problems in Hamlin et al. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
109, E1426; author reply E1427. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1204123109
Skerry, A., and Spelke, E. (2014). Preverbal infants identify emotional reac-
tions that are incongruent with goal outcomes. Cognition 130, 204–216. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2013.11.002
Sober, E., and Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of
Unselﬁsh Behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sokolov, E. N. (1963). Perception and the Conditioned Reﬂex. New York: MacMillan.
Todorov, A., and Uleman, J. S. (2003). The efﬁciency of binding spontaneous trait
inferences to actors’ faces. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 39, 549–562. doi: 10.1016/S0022-
1031(03)00059-3
Tomasello, M. (2009). Why We Cooperate. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Trivers R. L. (1971). Evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol. 46, 35–57. doi:
10.1086/406755
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Received: 17 March 2014; accepted: 30 May 2014; published online: 18 June 2014.
Citation: Hamlin JK(2014) Context-dependent social evaluation in 4.5-month-old
human infants: the role of domain-general versus domain-speciﬁc processes in the
development of social evaluation. Front. Psychol. 5:614. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00614
This article was submitted to Developmental Psychology, a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Hamlin. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or repro-
duction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with
accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Developmental Psychology June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 614 | 10
